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ARTICLES
Import Restraints and Reindustrialization: The
Case of the U.S. Steel Industry
by Joel B. Dirlam*
And
Hans Mueller,**
I. INTRODUCTION
T he topic we will discuss requires that one assume a link between im-
port restraints and reindustrialization. Before turning to the possible
sets of relations between the two, however, it is necessary to define
"reindustrialization." As it has been bandied about for the past year or
so, the term seems to mean a reorganization of certain U.S. industries
that would enable them to better meet foreign competition in both home
and international markets.1 The term "reindustrialization" is generally
applied to all industries threatened by imports, or even more broadly, to
those industries which are a drag on GNP growth. Reindustrialization re-
fers to policies that will reverse a downward trend in labor productivity or
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e Politica, SAo Paulo, Brazil (1960).
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CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
enhance an inadequate upward flow, raise the national rate of capital for-
mation, and augment useful expenditures on research and development.2
We have neither the time nor the competence to assess the broader
developments, including the emergence of the underground economy, that
might account for a lagging GNP, let alone its interaction with interna-
tional trade.3 Currently accepted assumptions are that savings rates are
higher abroad, innovations are more rapidly introduced, and labor more
loyal and industrious. It is necessary for us to put the steel industry in
perspective so that we can appraise the consequences of selecting among
various options for policy toward steel imports. Selection of the proper
policy is important not merely for reindustrialization of the steel industry
itself but for those industries that are consumers of steel. They make up
an important share4 of the manufacturing sector that is said to be exper-
iencing difficulties. If the costs of industrial steel consumers are in-
creased because of adoption of a policy designed to help the steel indus-
try, that policy will be counterproductive.
Before discussing restraints, it is essential to review the U.S. experi-
ence in protecting the steel industry. In most years since 1959, U.S. mill
prices of steel products have been above those of their European and Jap-
anese competitors. 5 The differential has fluctuated with exchange rates,
and especially with respect to our margin above the European ex-mill
2U.S. CONG., OFF. OF TECH. ASsESSMENT, U.S. INDUSTRIAL CoMPETIvENESs: A CoMPAR-
ISON OF STEEL, ELECTROICS, AND AuTOMOBILES, passim, H.R. REP. No. 308, 97TH CONG., IST
SESS. (1981) [hereinafter cited as OTA REPORT 1981].
3 Some of the complexities, not to say uncertainties, of assessing the causes of our in-
dustrial slowdown may be gleaned from Oi, Slack Capacity: Productive or Wasteful (No. 2),
71 AM. EcON. Rzv. 64 (1981); Baily, The Productivity Growth Slowdown and Capital Ac-
cumulation, id. at 326; Vatter, The Atrophy of Net Investment and Some Consequences for
the U.S. Mixed Economy, 16 J. ECON. IssuES 237 (1982).
4 See U.S. CONG. OFF. OF TECH. AssEssMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND STEEL INDUSTRY COM-
PETITIVENESS, H.R. REP. No., 96th CONG., 2d SESs. 172-79 (1980) [hereinafter cited as OTA
Report 1980]. The transportation equipment, fabricated metal products, and electrical ma-
chinery may be singled out. Together they account for 58 percent of all sales by the durable
goods manufacturing sector, SuRv. CURRENT Bus., Oct. 1981, at S-4, and for 52 percent of
this sector's total employment, MONTHLY LAB REv., Jan. 1982, at 70.
5For interregional average values (taken as a proxy for prices) realized in the European
Community, see Iron and Steel, EUROSTAT Y.B. 1970, 1976, 1979 and 1980; for Japanese
prices from 1961 to 1976 see K. KAWAHITO, THE JAPANESE STEEL INDUSTRY: PRICES AND
COSTS, 129 (Bus. and Econ. Research Center, Middle Tenn. St. U. Monograph No. 6, 1974);
Mueller & Kawahito, Economics of Dumping in the Steel Trade, Harvard University Semi-
nar on Steel Imports, Nov. 18, (1977). For estimates of "big buyer prices" in Japan for
various products and for U.S. prices in recent years, see Marcus & Kirsis, THE STEEL STRAT-
EGIST, Feb. 1982, Table 3. For U.S. prices, various products, 1955-1976, see COUNCIL ON
WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, Report to the President on PRICES AND COSTS IN THE U.S. STEEL
INDUSTRY 20 (1977). [Hereinafter cited as COWPS 1977].
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prices.6 In 1981, the U.S. mills were still at a disadvantage; Japanese
prices for the major product lines were about 20 percent below the prices
of the integrated U.S. plants, while the European differential exceeded 30
percent.7 For the products of the non-integrated American minimills, the
gaps were much smaller or non-existent.8
This price gap, prevailing over a period of 20 years, has created a
climate in which U.S. steel firms have organized and orchestrated a pro-
tectionist policy. Once having gained a foothold in 1959, imports in-
creased their market share. End users became accustomed to using im-
ported steel. 10 Although they suffered from inherent disadvantages in
competing in the U.S. market,1 foreign mills provided in many cases su-
perior service, and often a better quality product." Moreover, U.S. cus-
tomers found that relying on several suppliers reduced the risk of
unavailability.
II. A SUMMARIZED HISTORY OF STEEL PRODUCTION SINCE THE MID-
1960's
The U.S. steel industry launched its first major campaign against im-
ports in the mid-1960s when it became clear that imported steel had
6 ADAMS & MUELLER, The Steel Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY,
(W. Adams ed. 1982); METALS INTELLIGENCE INT'L, published by Paine Webber Mitchell
Hutchins Inc. in affiliation with its World Steel Dynamics Unit, 140 Broadway, N.Y. N.Y.
10005, Mar. 26, 1981, at 4-5, Dec. 2, 1981 at 1-2; Marcus, supra note 5, Tables 3 and 4.
ESTIMATED FROM METALS INTELLIGENCE INV'L, supra note 5, at 5-7.
* Howard, Minimills Expanding with Optimism, AM. METAL MKT., Dec. 15, 1980, at 32,
col. 2.
9 See Table 1, and OTA REPORT 1981, supra note 2, at 50.
'0 The volume of steel imports in the 1980s assumed a staircase pattern, with the steps
occurring in years of labor-contract negotiations. Adams, supra note 6, Fig. 1 at 83; L.
KiERs, THE AMEImCAN STEEL INDUSTRY. PROBLEMS, CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 10, 12
(1980). The surges were caused by consumer hedge buying in anticipation of potential sup-
ply disruptions due to strikes.
11 "There are many disadvantages experienced by purchasers of imported steel which
translate into hidden costs which purchasers must assume. Purchasers of imported steel
must wait for steel ordered from abroad for a longer period of time than domestic custom-
ers. Currency fluctuations may run against the purchaser. With the steel being handled by
so many more transport facilities, there tends to be more damaged steel and more rusted
steel than in the case of domestic purchases. The purchaser also runs the risk of delays in
ocean carriage which can disrupt his manufacturing operations," Statement by Alfred R.
McCauley in Opposition to the U.S. Steel Antidumping Petitions before the U.S. Int'l Trade
Commission Apr. 17, 1980, at 38-39. See also L. FRmEN, INSTABILrrY IN THE INTERNATIONAL
STEEL MARKET 58, 63 (1972).
12 J. JONDRow, et. al., THE PRICE DIFFERENTmAL BmTmN DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED
STEEL, (Center for Naval Analysis 1977); COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS,
NEW STRATEGY REQUIRED FOR AIDING DISTRESSED STEEL INDUSTRY, Ch. 3 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as GAO STEEL REPORT].
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come to stay.13 The drive reached a high level of intensity in 1968, when
18 million tons of imported steel accounted for 16.7 percent of the domes-
tic market. 4 Domestic firms began to break ranks and published prices
were discounted.1 5 With the conclusion of "voluntary" restraining agree-
ments (VRA) between the State Department and the steel producers of
the European Economic Community 6 and Japan,17 price discipline was
restored in 1969.18 Had imports not been checked, both the State Depart-
ment and the foreign mills and governments were convinced that the U.S.
steel industry had the political power to obtain quota legislation.29
The VRA lapsed in 1974, partly as a result of a suit brought by the
Consumers Union.2 0 Beginning in August of the same year, the interna-
tional steel market suffered from a prolonged recession 2 with occasional
partial remissions. The decline in demand, which has characteristics that
indicate it is more than a mere reflection of the normal business cycle,
has been accompanied by an increase in steel-making capacity.2 2 Firms
have been established in the Third World and their steel has been ex-
ported to developed countries, especially the United States. 23 In the Eu-
ropean Economic Community, where tacit collusion or price discipline
could not be enforced because a diversity of nationalities made such col-
lusion or price discipline impracticable, home market prices dropped se-
verely, and most steel producers suffered losses that have continued to
13 BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM ON AM. IRON & STEEL INST. IMPORT POLICY, reprinted in
113 CONG. REC. 4342, 44 (1967) [hereinafter cited as AISI MEMO].
4 Table 1 p. 23; Adams, supra note 6, Fig. 1, at 83.
15 FED. BUREAU OF ECON. TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES
STEEL INDUSTRY AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RIVALS: TRENDS AND FACTORS DETERMINING INTER-
NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, 173, 175 (1977).
16 W. HOGAN, THE 1970s: CRITICAL YEARS FOR STEEL, 54-57 (1972).
17 Id.
18 COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, A STUDY OF STEEL PRICES, 11 (1975).
19 The circumstances surrounding the adoption of the VRA are discussed in R. CRAN-
DELL, THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY IN RECURRENT CRISIS, 41 (1981): Adams & Mueller, supra
note 6, at 99.
30 Although the antitrust issue had not been formally presented, it was mentioned in
the lower court opinion, Consumers Union v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (D.D.C. 1973).
aff'd as modified sub. nom. Consumers Union of U.S. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975), and in the opinion of the circuit court, a possibil-
ity remained that foreign firms participating in restraints could be liable to suits under the
Sherman Act. See also L. Kiers, supra note 10, at 12.
21 INT'L IRON AND STEEL INST, CAUSES OF THE MID-1970S RECESSION IN STEEL DEMAND,
Ch. 3, Sec. 1 (1980).
22 INT'L IRON AND STEEL INST., STEEL CAPACITIES: WESTERN WORLD 1974-1980s passim
(1977); WIRTSCHAFTSVEREINIGUNG EISEN-UND STAHLINDUSTRIE, STATISTISCHES JABRBUCH
(1981) at 306.
' INT'L IRON AND STEEL INST., World-Steel Trade by Area, 1979, WORLD STEEL IN
FIGURES 15 (1974-1981).
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the present.24 By contrast, the Japanese industry only lost money in 1975
and 197725 and recovered in the following years as a result of superior
efficiency and a vigorous export drive.2" In 1982, operating at less than 70
percent of capacity, the Japanese mills were profitable.
After a 25 percent drop of 3.9 million tons from 1974 to 1975, imports
into the U.S. rose steadily.2 8 The increase from 1975 to 1977 was material.
Low prices of imports and an inability to maintain posted prices troubled
domestic producers more than the volume of imports, however. Largely as
a result of defensive discounting,"9 industry profits dropped almost to
zero in 1977, although domestic shipments were higher than in either of
the previous two years.
Intensive lobbying by the steel industry and by the United Steel
Workers, exerted through the newly formed Congressional "Steel Cau-
cus", put the Carter Administration under renewed pressure to reduce
the flow of imports.3 0 Government officials were staunchly opposed to ne-
gotiating new "voluntary" quotas, and advised the industry to file an-
tidumping petitions; but they retreated from this position when the firms
responded enthusiastically by submitting a broadside of complaints.3 1 If
these petitions had been successful, it was quite likely that a trade war
would have been provoked with the European Economic Community. Af-
ter the Administration put together a novel procedure for controlling im-
ports, the so-called "trigger price mechanism" (TPM),32 the antidumping
petitions were withdrawn.38 Purporting to be no more than a "device to
monitor imports", the TPM actually established de facto minimum prices
for most steel products imported into the United States, based on esti-
24 Marcus, Financial Analysis of International Steelmakers, STATUS REPORT, (Availa-
ble from Paine Webber Mitchell & Hutchins) Sept. 16, 1981, at 9.
25 ISmKAWA & ENDO, JAPAN's STEEL INDusTRY-WoRLD LEADER IN THE EIGHTIES, (Avail-
able from Daiwa Securities Co., Ltd. Research Dept.) 24 (1980).
28 Id. at 23.
27 METAL BuLL., Nov. 24, 1981 at 33; A. BRD AsSOciATEs, STEEL ANALYSIS, (Dec. 1981);
C. Bradford, STEEL INDUSTRY Q., Feb. 1972, at 70 (Available from Merrill Lynch Pierce Fen-
ner & Smith).
28 See Table 1 at 23.
29 R. CRANDALL, supra note 19; C. Bradford, STEEL INDusTRY Q., Feb. 1972, at 4; IRON
AGE, May 22, 1978, at 43.
30 Adams & Mueller, supra note 6, at 101-102, 130; R. Crandall, supra note 19, at 42.
31 McCormack, The Reinstated Steel Trigger Price Mechanism: Reinforced Barrier To
Import Competition, 4 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 289, 303 n.95 (1981).
22 UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY A. SOLOMON, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT" A CoM-
PREHENSIVE PROGRAM FOR THE STEEL INDusTRY, released Dec. 6, 1977 [hereinafter cited as
Solomon Report], reprinted in Hearings on the Administration's Comprehensive Program
for the Steel Industry Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-38 (1978).
22 McCormack, supra note 31, at 310.
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mated production costs, including profit, of Japanese steel producers.3 4
Since the domestic industry had been claiming that it was as efficient as
any of its foreign competitors, and could compete successfully if only
competition were fair, the U.S. mills could not object to giving the TPM a
chance. 5
During its first year in operation, the new system not only ended dis-
counting by domestic producers but it also raised import prices by about
10 percent.38 Although the volume of imports climbed to a peak in 1978,
firmer prices and a buoyant demand generated a significant rebound in
industry profits. The quarterly increases in the trigger prices that ac-
counted for the steel industry's prosperity, however, were attributable
primarily to a strengthening of the yen relative to the dollar,38 thus rais-
ing the dollar price of the Japanese benchmark costs.3 9 By the middle of
1979, when the dollar ceased to fall, trigger prices inevitably stablized to
reflect stationary Japanese costs. Indeed, if the dollar failed to drop, or
began to rise against the yen, the trigger price might begin to decline even
with continuous improvement in Japanese productivity.0
As long as the triggers continued to move upward in each successive
quarter, the TPM was accepted by the industry, albeit grudgingly. Impa-
tient with the government's refusal to raise the trigger, however, U.S.
Steel filed antidumping petitions against all major steel producers of the
European Economic Community in March 1980.41 Keeping its word, the
Administration promptly suspended 42 the TPM, on the ground that it
had been instituted as an alternative to the filing of major antidumping
petitions by private parties. The antidumping proceedings resulted in a
preliminary finding by the ITC that there was a reasonable indication
that sales at less than fair value had injured the domestic industry.4' At
34 Solomon Report, supra note 32, at 13-18; 42 Fed. Reg. 65, 214 (1977); 43 Fed. Reg.
6065 (1978).
35 For a comprehensive review of the background of the adoption of TPM, as well as of
its provisions and application, see McCormack, supra note 31, passim.
Crandall, supra note 19, at 109-110.
37 STEEL TRIGGER PRICE MECHANIM: A ONE-YEAR REVIEW for the Steel Tripartite Com-
mittee (June 25, 1979) at 3 and attachment C.
3 Marcus & Kirsis, supra note 5, at 20.
: C. Bradford, STEEL INDUSTRY Q., Feb. 1982, at 36.
40 Id. The Treasury Department lowered trigger prices in the third quarter of 1979. On
Japanese productivity see H. Mueller, The Competitiveness of the U.S. Steel Industry after
the New Trigger Price Mechanism, (Bus. & Econ. Research Center, Middle Tenn. St. Univ.,
Monograph No. 25 (1980)), see Tables III and IV, at 27.
" 45 Fed. Reg. 20, 150 (1980).
42 Id.
43 U.S. Int'l Trade Commission Determination of the Investigations Nos. 731-TA-18-24
(Preliminary) Under the Tariff Act of 1930, Together with the Information Contained in the
Investigations. Certain Carbon Steel Products from Belgium, the Federal Republic of Ger-
Vol. 14:419
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this point, the European Economic Community began to threaten retalia-
tory action if the proceedings should eventuate in the imposition of an-
tidumping duties. Several months of negotiation44 resulted in the revision
of the TPM to permit a substantial price increase, and to provide for an
automatic investigation of imports rising above a specific share of the do-
mestic market when the industry was operating at less than 87 percent of
capacity.45 As a quid pro quo, U.S. Steel withdrew its petition.46
As time passed, however, the industry became increasingly dissatis-
fied with the revised TPM. Opponents of the program argued that the
TPM was not being consistently or vigorously applied against a continu-
ing flow of imports whose list prices were subject to discounting.47 In ef-
many, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, Pub. No.
1064 (1980) at 1.
4' McCormack, supra note 31, at 315.
45 THE WHITE HOUSE, A PROGRAM FOR THE AMERICAN STEEL INDUSTRY, ITS WORKERS
AND COMMUNITIES, Sept. 30, 1980; 45 Fed. Reg. 66833-66835 (1980). The suppression and
subsequent reinstitution of the TPM under the Carter Administration were carried out in
circumstances very similar to those leading up to the promotion of the VRA under Nixon,
and the first adoption of the TPM under Carter. Under the industry's game plan, petitions
were filed under the Antidumping Statute that, if carried to fruition, would have placed the
U.S. government in an untenable position vis-a-vis the European Economic Community. In
desperation, the Administration placated the industry with a compromise that was probably
inflationary, and certainly raised costs to steel users, but which had the advantage of put-
ting off the day when, under GATT rules, U.S. exporting industries would be subjected to
retaliatory action.
"' 45 Fed. Reg. 66833 (1980), DEPT. OF COMMERCE, REINSTATEMENT OF THE STEEL TRIG-
GER PRICE MECHANISM, Vol. 45, No. 197 (1980).
47 Skrzycki, 2 U.S. Mills Ask Pre-Clearance Denial, AM. MTAL MKT., Aug. 5, 1981 at
1, col. 1; Chase & Krause, Trigger Price Mechanism Under Pressure, AM. MTrAL MKT.,
Sept. 15, 1981 at 1, col. 2; News Roundup: Stricter Enforcement of Trigger System Sought
by Process, AM. METAL MKT., Oct. 1, 1981, at 1, col. 4; Kramer, Steel Imports Rising in
Great Lakes; Prices Below Triggers, AM. METAL MKT., Oct. 6, 1981 at 1, col. 3; Peters, New
Trigger Manual Sealing Loopholes, AM. METAL MKT., Oct. 9, 1981 at 1, col. 3; Haflich, West
Coast Steel Slump Deepens; Imports Set Record in East, AM. METAL MKT., Oct. 9, 1981 at
1, col. 1; Wasik, Steel Imports Rise at Chicago, Undercut Triggers $40-$651T, AM. METAL
MKT. Nov. 5, 1981 at 1, col. 3. The Trigger Price Mechanism was under severe attack not
only by domestic steel producers but by trade associations representing steel distributors.
Most vocal among these were the Association of Steel Distributors and the Steel Service
Center Institute, both of which asked for the discontinuation of the TPM and the imposi-
tion of quotas on imported steel.
U.S. distributors were troubled because importers owned or controlled by European
mills sold steel at low figures which did not violate the trigger minimum because the steel
had already entered the U.S. at the trigger price. Losses on such sales could be covered by
the affiliated mills, or other off-shore sellers. Alternatively, the affiliated off-shore purchaser
bought the product below trigger price, and made the first sale in the U.S. to the affiliated
importer at trigger price. The profit was made by the off-shore affiliate. Nothing, of course,
prevented domestic distributors from doing the same thing and some of them did indeed go
this route. Steel Import Quotas Eyed by SSCI, AM. METAL MKT., Oct. 8, 1981 at 1, col. 4.
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forts to avoid the filing of new antidumping petitions, the administration
first tried the back-fire solution in November of 1981, by initiating a
countervailing duty investigation on carbon steel plate from Belgium,
Brazil, France, and South Africa, and an antidumping investigation on
steel plate from Romania.4 1 The Secretary of Commerce went to Brussels
in December in what was to prove a futile attempt to persuade the
Europeans to promise to limit exports. 49 Brushing aside the promises of
stronger enforcement of the TPM, U.S. Steel and several other major
steel producers filed sweeping countervailing duty and antidumping peti-
tions against steel exporters from Germany, France, England, Italy,
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, and Brazil on January
11, 1982.50 The Reagan Administration appears to have washed its hands
of the matter, and after once again suspending the TPM, will let the in-
vestigations run their course."1
III. AGGREGATE ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF PROTECTION
Whether the protective institutions the government has introduced
since 1968 have raised the price and reduced the quantity of imported
steel, and by how much, is difficult to determine with precision. There
can be no question, however, that the protection made it possible to in-
crease the price of domestically manufactured steel, and to transfer
purchasing power from the general public to the steel industry and its
employees. For the VRA, careful estimates of the cost, made on somewhat
different assumptions about the nature of the U.S. steel market, range
from $386 million to $1 billion.2 For the TPM, the cost has been esti-
mated at close to $1 billion for each of the years 1978 and 1979."3 This
latter estimate understates the cost because it does not take into account
the disappearance of price discounting, which had been rampant among
domestic producers prior to the introduction of the TPM.4
Protection, either in the form of direct restriction on imports effected
'a U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM.; Carbon Steel Plate From Belgium; Initiation of Counter-
vailing Duty Investigation Vol. 46, No. 222, (1981) 46 Fed. Reg. 56635-56637, U.S. INT'L
TRADE COMM., Carbon Steel Plate From Romania; Initiation of Antidumping Investigation,
Vol. 46, No. 222 (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 57784 (1981) and U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., Hot-Rolled
Carbon Steel Plate from Belgium and Brazil; Countervailing Duty Investigations and Con-
ference. (n.1)(A-1) (1982).
"o News Roundup, U.S., Europe Seeking Steel Imports Pact, AM. METAL MKT., Dec.
15, 1981, at 1, col. 1; Peters, Baldridge Warns Steel Export Solution is Up to EEC, AM.
METAL MKT. Dec. 16, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
50 47 Fed. Reg. 5744-5754 (1982).
51 Am. METAL MKT., Jan. 13, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
52 Adams & Mueller, supra note 6, at 117.
13 R. Crandall, supra note 19, at 139.
54 WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
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by the VRA, or by preventing price competition among imports and mod-
erating competition between imports and domestic products through the
TPM, transferred income from consumers to the protected manufactur-
ers.5 5 But as shown in Table 4, there is little or no indication that the
U.S. steel firms used their additional income to foste; increased efficiency
or to invest in needed technological updating. Regional product markets
were becoming less dependent on major plant concentrations; and equip-
ment installed prior to 1960 needed modernization." The necessary deci-
sions were postponed because of the extended breathing space offered by
the succession of protective instruments and the declining value of the
dollar. Until the late 1970s, the industry made little progress in bringing
its technological level and plant efficiency up to levels achieved in Japan
and Europe. 57
IV. SPECIFIC CONSEQUENCES OF PROTECTION
A. Distortions in Resource Use
The VRA to a degree, and most certainly the TPM because of its
price-fixing, distorted the patterns of domestic consumption both with re-
spect to the geographic flow of imported steel, and with respect to the use
of domestic instead of imported steel by certain consuming industries.8
Taking up first the alterations in the transportation cost-related flows of
domestic and imported steel, the TPM formulae incorporated artificial
transportation costs in their price minima. Certain U.S. regions, notably
the fastgrowing markets of the Western and Southwestern States, can be
served by domestic integrated mills from the Midwestern and Northeast-
ern States only at the cost of a substantial freight premium which makes
the American product more expensive in these markets. 59 This would be
true even if ex-mill costs were identical for American and foreign produc-
ers. The TPM system, based as it was solely on Japanese transport costs,
put domestic steel competing on the West Coast at an even more than
normal disadvantage. Great Lakes c.i.f. prices, on the other hand, which
had been relatively low, were elevated far above their usual levels by us-
"' See notes 52 and 53, supra.
" Adams & Mueller, supra note 6, at 87, 109, 120, 128.
57 B. Gold, Steel Technologies and Costs in the United States and Japan, (prepared
for the OTA Select Panel on the Steel Industry), (Dec. 1, 1977).
8 See generally, on the disruptions introduced by the TPM, H. Mueller, Distortions
Resulting from Sectoral Solutions to Problems in the U.S. Steel Market, Presentation to
Atlantic Economic Conference, New York, (Oct. 9, 1981).
" Freight rates from Chicago to Los Angeles range from $105 to $111 per ton for plates
and structurals compared with $30 to $45 on shipments from Japan. Telephone interview
with Conrail Tariff Authority Spokesperson, July 27, 1982.
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ing the transport cost from Japan. 0 Much imported steel was thereby
excluded from the Great Lakes, unless it was to be sold at less than the
trigger price.
Domestic regional capacity in sheet and plate products in the West-
ern and Gulf markets is insufficient to satisfy demand except in a severe
recession, so that these areas would ordinarily have consumed a substan-
tial amount of imported product."' To the extent that the trigger prices
were effective maximum prices, domestic sheet and plate could not main-
tain even its justified share of these markets.
In certain product lines, especially tubular goods, 62 domestic capacity
was inadequate to meet demand whereas in others, imported steel has
carved out a niche for itself because of its superior quality. 3 Many Amer-
ican steel users began to buy imported steel because domestic mills had
tended to neglect customer service and importers were anxious to please
new buyers. Furthermore, some foreign mills were willing to supply cer-
tain products, such as odd sizes and small batches of plates, that domes-
tic mills would not have bothered to make available. 5
60 The differences in delivered prices between the West Coast and the Great Lakes as
set by the TPM formulae, varied from $8 per 100 lbs. for plates to $32 for seamless pipe,
and for the majority of products was approximately $12 per 100 lbs. See Marcus & Kirsis,
WSD Monitor Reports Steel Pricing, Core Report A, WORLD STEEL DYNAMIcs, Nov. 1979, at
A-3-105, 107.
"' "Producers in the Western States do not have the capacity to satisfy the region's
demand for many carbon steel mill products. Capacity to produce tin mill products and
pipes and tubes was below consumption throughout the 1972-78 period while capacity to
produce sheets and strip was below consumption in all years except 1975, a year of unusu-
ally low demand," U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., Pub. No. 1004, Final Report on Investigation
No. 332-87 Under Sec. 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, As Amended, Conditions of Competi-
tion in the Western U.S. Steel Market Between Certain Domestic and Foreign Steel Prod-
ucts 32 (1979).
"2 Purchases of "oil country tubular goods" increased from 2.6 million tons in 1979 to
6.1 million tons in 1981. In the same period, domestic shipments rose from 2.5 to 4.2 million
tons, Bradford, supra note 39, at 29. A chart prepared by the National Supply Co., a subsid-
iary of Armco, shows a large excess of U.S. demand for oil country tubular goods over pro-
duction capacity, METAL BULL. Sept. 4, 1981 at 35.
"S The higher quality of some of the imported steel has been verified by several surveys.
"[M]ost companies who criticized domestic steel quality pointed to Japanese steel as exem-
plary. The officials, however, identified high quality steel purchased from mills in 14 other
countries. As a rule, the high quality was derived from more modem plants regardless of the
country in which located." GAO STEEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 346. Rolling equipment
operated by the integrated domestic steel firms has a higher average than similar equipment
in Europe and Japan. For cold-rolling and plate mills see Adams & Mueller, supra note 6, at
117; for plate, hotstrip, cold-rolling, and rod mills-U.K., Germany and U.S. only-see J.
Aylen, Plant Size and Efficiency in the Steel Industry: an International Comparison, at 16
(Econ. Dep't U. of Salford, Sept. 1981).
" AISI MEMO supra note 13, at 818; GAO STEEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 3-10-3-12.
65 GAO STEEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 3-7.
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B. Higher Costs to Consumers of Steel
Protection of the U.S. steel industry and higher steel prices tended to
shift imports from semi-finished steel to fabricated steel or steel-contain-
ing products that were not controlled by the TPM system."6 American
steel users who had to pay considerably higher prices for their steel than
their foreign rivals found their competiveness reduced in both their home
markets and abroad.67
While the cost increase attributable to the VRA or the TPM may be
relatively small for sophisticated steel fabricating activities,"' the burden
is greater on those industries for which expenditures on purchased steel
inputs is a substantial part of total costs. These industries include those
firms fabricating dry-docks, drilling platforms, bridge components, large
containers, heavy equipment for the energy industry, wire rope, forgings,
and fasteners.69 Other predictable cost raising consequences of the TPM
took the form of a squeeze, and inevitably led to pressures to bring more
finished steel products under the system.70 For example, West Coast wire
product fabricators, who compete against imported fabricated products
made from off-shore low-cost wire rod, were disadvantaged when they
had to purchase wire rod at trigger prices.71 To put competition on a fair
basis, either wire rod should have been exempted from the TPM, or all
fabricated wire products would have to be included. Similarly, the auto-
mobile industry had to pay $100 to $150 more for steel per car or truck
than its foreign competitors. 72 Although steel cost is only a small part of
" See McCormack, supra note 31 at 313, 314, and Bennett, Fabricator's Import De-
fense Begins to Take Shape, IRON AGE (July 17, 1978) at 24.
17 R. CRANDALL, supra note 19, at 150, Table 8-2.
" For illustrations, see CABINET COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC POLICIES, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY (1971), at 54.
49 According to Daniel Minchew, former Chairman of the International Trade Commis-
sion, the introduction of the TPM caused the basic materials cost of fastener producers to
rise as much as 30 percent. Bowers, Carter Was Wrong on Fasteners-Minchew, IRON AGE,
July 17, 1978, at 30. A trade paper report referred to "an increasing number of reports in
the last year that forgings, most frequently from Italian sources, were being sold at prices
below the cost of raw steel, and a growing belief that this is a device for avoidance of the
steel price mechanism," Am. METAL MKT., Nov. 17, 1981, at 1 col.1.
70 In 1978, trigger prices were extended to fabricated wire products. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,
383 (1978); IRON AGE, July 17, 1978, at 25-26.
7' Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1978). David Walker is
a large fabricator of wire products which buys steel wire rod as its primary raw material. Its
integrated competitors, and those competitors that are subsidiaries or associates of foreign
producers of wire rod, were able to sell fabricated wire products at prices that substantially
squeezed Davis Walker's (and other independent wire products fabricators') margin. Id. at
246. The Dept. of Commerce finally remedied this inequity. See, e.g. note 70.
73 A spokesman for the Armco Steel Corporation declared that the savings from the use
of imported steel "would not exceed $150 per car," Letter to the Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1981 at
4, col. 2. The Carter Administration evidently had no doubt that controls on steel imports
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the sticker price of an automobile the total annual cost increase is nearly
$1 billion.3
V. PROTECTION AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE AMERICAN STEEL
INDUSTRY
The stated purpose of the first major interference with U.S. steel
trade in the postwar period, the 1969-1974 voluntary restraint agree-
ments, was to provide breathing space in which the steel industry was
expected to improve its structure and efficiency.7' Unpredictable in-
creases in the volume of imports were seen as a disruptive influence on
the industry's modernization efforts.
There is little evidence that the industry undertook such efforts.
Capital expenditures during the period fell considerably short of the
amounts spent in the preceding six-year period.75 Virtually nothing was
done to tidy up the splintered structure of the firms, to close down obso-
lete installations,7 6 or to improve product specialization in individual
plants.7" Due to the existence of many undersized plants, excessive dupli-
cation of expensive equipment took place.78 Capital productivity re-
mained below that attained by the steel industries of Europe and Japan
when measured in terms of productive capacity installed or replaced per
dollar invested.7 9 The industry managed to defend its advantages in labor
productivity relative to most of the European industries, but it began to
would only hurt the domestic automobile industry. Robert Hormats, deputy U.S. trade rep-
resentative, expressed concern that any action resulting in higher steel prices "will make our
cars that much more expensive. We are sensitive to the impact of price measures in the steel
area on the auto industry." AM. MErAL MKT., Mar. 31, 1980 at 2, col. 1.
73 It may be assumed that the total number of motor vehicles produced each year will
approach, as a minimum, 8 million. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. (1980), at 648. See
also OTA REPORT 1981, supra note 2, at 16.
7' See OFFICE OF THE WHITE HousE PRESS SECRETARY, STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT,
May 6, 1972, reprinted in W. HOGAN, supra note 16, at 70-71; AND FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIs-
SION, supra note 15, at 74; OTA REPORT 1981, supra note 2, at 111.
75 AISI, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, Table 1c at 9 (1975).
7' Adams & Mueller, supra note 6, at 87-89.
1 R. CRANDALL, Steel Industry Productivity and Public Policy, in W. GOLDBERG, INT'L
INST. OF MGMT., BERLIN, GERMANY, THE CASE OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY. 120-125 (1982); N.Y.
Times Jul. 20, 1980 at F3, col. 1.
71 W. HOGAN, supra note 16, at 34.
7' Capital productivity is inferred from the cost of putting into place and maintaining
an industry's productive capacity. From 1950 to 1979 the U.S. steel industry invested a
total of $63.9 billion into its steel operations, measured in 1978 dollars, exclusive of nonsteel
investment, and in Japanese purchasing power equivalent (the original U.S. figures were
adjusted by a factor of .8 to take account of lower Japanese construction costs). For three
different periods, the results were as follows (total investment expenditures and amounts
per ton of finished steel capacity added or replaced):
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lose out to the Japanese by 1973,80 and to the Germans by 1979.81 Like-
wise, in energy productivity the American steel industry continued to
trail both the Japanese and the Europeans. 2 Adoption rates of innovative
technology are difficult to evaluate because specific conditions often differ
significantly between national industries.8 Table 4, which contains sev-
eral indicators of technological performance, reveals that the American
steel industry, particularly the integrated producers, generally lagged be-
hind foreign competitors.8 4
A prolonged strike and threats of strikes played a major role in draw-
ing foreign steel to the American market. However, there is little evidence
that import protection swayed the United Steel Workers (USW) to relent
in demands concerning wages and work rules. Steelworkers' wages and
fringe benefits have traditionally been above the average level for manu-
facturing in the United States. Between the end of WWII and 1968, this
premium had grown from 15 percent to 29 percent.8 5 It soared to more
than 50 percent by the time the quota agreements expired and further to
75 percent in 1981 as a result of concessions made to induce the union to
bar nationwide strikes.8 6 In contrast, Japanese steelworkers' total employ-
1950-1979 1960-1979 1965-1979
Per cap. Per cap. Per cap.
Totals ton Totals ton Totals ton
U.S. $63.9* $419 $45.1* $524 $35.3* $525
EC (of Six) 64.2 387 48.9 448 34.1 353
Japan 61.6 337 57.4 463 50.1 414
*This column in billions of dollars.
Source: H. Mueller, The U.S. Steel Industry after the Trigger Price System, BUREAU OF
Bus. AND ECON. RESEARCH MIDDLE TENN. ST. U. (Dec. 1980) at 7; and H. MUELLER, THE
STEEL INDUSTRY, BUREAU OF Bus. AND ECON. RESEARCH, MIDDLE TENN. ST. U. (Aug. 1981) at
12.
80 U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF PRO-
DUCTIVE AND LABOR COSTS IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY: UNITED STATES, JAPAN, FRANCE, GER-
MANY, UNITED KINGDOM 1964 AND 1980, 1981, at 2.
81 Id.
82 INTERNATIONAL IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE, 1980 STATISTICAL Y.B. at 42.
83 B. GOLD, G. ROSEGGER, & M. BOYLAN, EVALUATING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 95-
106, 129-130 and 191-209 (1980).
" COWPS REPORT, supra note 5, at 127.
.' Id.
88 The lagging performance of the steel industry with regard to value-added-per-pro-
duction-worker-hour, the BLS productivity index, and the above-average rise in steelwork-
ers' wages are shown in tabular and graphical form, for the years 1960 to 1979, in OTA
REPORT 1981, supra note 2, at 54-60.
"Labor represents about 35 percent of domestic production costs. Were steel workers
compensated at the historic level of 130-135 percent of average manufacturing wages instead
of the current 175 percent level, production costs would be $4 billion lower a year, or $30-
$40 less per ton.
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ment cost per hour exceeds the manufacturing average by about 30 per-
cent and the European Community by only 15 percent."7
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF PROTECTION: CONCLUSION
The VRA, and the successive versions of the TPM undoubtedly ben-
efited large U.S. steel companies and their employees by sheltering them
from the impact of keen foreign competition. We have also seen that the
managers of those companies did not take sufficient advantage of the cash
flow and breathing space afforded them by the protection to reorganize
their management and to modernize their plants. Jonathan Aylen's au-
thoritative review of plant efficiency concludes that:
American steel firms typically operate a number of fairly large, highly
integrated works, each producing a wide product range, but made up of
smaller plant units, often duplicating undersized plant items within 8 a
works.
America tends to fall badly behind at processes where technology
has evolved steadily over time, such as blast furnaces, strip mills and rod
mills . . . . As a result large American works are composed of older,
smaller and technically backward plant items8 9 .... The American steel
industry has broadly maintained its output while running down its capi-
tal stock .... The run-down has been delayed by low energy prices and
protection."0
It is simply not the case, as the spokesmen for the large companies
have asserted, that the funds were not available to make the necessary
improvements.9 1
The higher the wage premium that the industry must pay, the more difficult any revi-
talization will be." GAO STEEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 7-13. And see R. Anderson and M.
Kreinin, Labour Costs in the American Steel and Auto Industries, 4 WORLD ECON. 199, 208
(1981).
97 EUROSTAT, Wages and Incomes, No. 3, 1981 at 2, and No. 4, 1981 at 1-2; T. Kono,
The U.S. Steel Industry Since World War II, Tokyo, Nippon Steel Corporation, at 61
(1980). We have corrected for use of contract workers who are paid about 30 percent less in
total hourly wages and compensation than regular employees. More than one third of all
employees of Japanese steel plants are contract workers. See H. MUELLER & K. KAWiAHrro,
STEEL INDUSTRY ECON.: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND PERFORM-
ANCE, (1978) at 17, Table 2.1, n. 8.
j. Aylen, supra note 63 at 12.
8 Id. at 15.
90 Id. at 18.
' According to David M. Roderick, U.S. Steel Chairman, "If we had the cash flow [in
the steel sector], would we have more casters? Yes. If we had the cash flow, would we still
have 17% open hearths? No." FORBES, Jan. 5, 1981 at 192. The issue was not, however, that
U.S. Steel did not have the funds for modernizing its aging steel plants; it was rather that
the company did not consider steel an attractive investment choice. On January 1, 1982,
U.S. Steel paid $3.8 billion for 51 percent of the shares of Marathon Oil Co. and the remain-
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At the same time, there have been some favorable consequences of
competition. During the three years between the demise of the VRA and
the installation of the TPM, the domestic industry has had to face im-
ports in a free market. There were widely publicized plant closures,92 and
associated job losses.93  In 1977, several major plants and installations
were permanently shut down. Furthermore, after the interlude of 1978
and 1979, the boost in import prices as a result of the TPM reduced the
urgency of structural shrinkage, and diminished the steelworker's worries
about job security.""
Rationalization efforts were undertaken once more when demand
dropped again in late 1979, and the TPM was suspended in 1980. Several
large steel companies shut down blast furnaces, converters, and rolling
mills that had long since lost their competitiveness, compared with do-
mestic minimills and foreign mills.95 Nearly all large companies brought
in foreign consultants to help increase the efficiency of their plants.'
There are also indications that the USW is adopting a more flexible atti-
ing shares, if the merger is affirmed, will be converted into 12.5 percent notes of U.S. Steel
Corp. U.S. STEEL CORP., 1981 ANN. RPT. 36-37 (1982). The industry attempts to back up its
claims of insufficient capital spending by pointing to lower average capital expenditures by
the U.S. industry, per ton of raw steel produced 1972-1977, than by its major rivals (e.g.
U.S. $19, Japan $26, Germany $24, France $28). AM. IRON AND STEEL INST., STEEL AT THE
CROSSROADS: THE AMERICAN STEEL INDUSTRY IN THE 1980s, (1980) ch. 3. [hereinafter cited as
AISI STEEL CROSSROADS]. However, in contrast with their rivals, the U.S. firms financed
virtually no growth out of these expenditures. If the effects of these differences in capacity
expansion were taken properly into account-by estimating the amounts spent per ton of
capacity added or replaced-the domestic industry can be shown to have outspent both the
Europeans and the Japanese, even after allowance is made for the considerable non-steel
investments made by the U.S. industry. For the 1960-1979 period our results were as follows
(in 1978 dollars per ton of finished steel capacity added or replaced): U.S. $524, the original
European Community (of six members) $448, and Japan $463. See note 79 supra at 12.
During this period, the U.S. industry added about 11 million tons of finished steel-product
capacity, whereas the Europeans added 65 million tons and the Japanese 107 million tons.
Replacement estimates (based on a 25 year capital life) were as follows: U.S. 75 million tons,
European Community 44 million tons, Japan 17 million tons.
Our explanation of the low capital productivity achieved by the integrated domestic
producers is that poor structural characteristics (small plant siz.e and deficient layout) led to
the costly duplication of investment efforts, the installation of undersized equipment, as
well as suboptimal utilization of new equipment.
92 W. HOGAN, STEEL IN CRISIS, (1977), passim.
93 Id.; N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1978 S4 at 1, col. 1.
" IRON AGE, Oct. 2, 1978, at 26-28; Wall St. J. Aug. 29, 1979 at 4, col. 1; D. Ignatius,
Who Killed the Steel Industry?, WASH. MONTHLY, March 1979, at 19.
,5 See Haller, Primary Steel Production-A New Opportunity For Small Business, R.I.
Bus. Q., Dec. 1965, at 3-5; Hirschhorn, Confirming Success for United States Mini-Mills,
METAL BULLETIN'S Second International Mini-Mills Conference, Paper B (1981).
" Ishikawa & Endo, supra note 25, at 22; MzETAL BULL. Feb. 3, 1981, at 31; METAL
BULL., Feb. 10, 1981, at 31; METAL BULL., July 24, 1981, at 31; METAL BULL., Sept. 8, 1981, at
37.
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tude concerning work rules, and in isolated instances, even workers' bene-
fits.9 7 In short, it was not the breathing space created by protectionist
measures that stimulated management and eventually labor to give seri-
ous attention to the task of improving industry performance, but rather
the shock of renewed foreign competition when protection was tempora-
rily lifted from the U.S. steel market, and the sustained competition from
efficient domestic minimills."" It is interesting that Mr. Roderick, who is
now anxious to use U.S. Steel's managerial expertise in the energy field,
has borne witness to a revolutionary change in U.S. Steel's policies. List-
ing strategies to guide the company in the eighties, he said,
We will modernize what can be updated to our long term benefit. We
will not pour dollars into a bottomless pit of antiquated facilities with
problems that can't be fixed. . . . [T]he corporation is moving to a true
division organization with each group vice president in charge of his par-
ticular business segment .... [W]e are now perceived as a company on
the move, that U.S. Steel is looked upon as a place where a young person
can go to work and have opportunity for the future .... 1
The economics of Mr. Roderick's program for new investment and aban-
donments, and his efforts to change the image of U.S. Steel are not debat-
able. His emphasis on the importance of, and the necessity for a changed
strategy, however, only underscored the imperfection of the previous
management regimes.
VII. POLIcY TOWARD IMPORTS
In selecting the policy toward steel imports which will be good not
only for the steel industry, but for the country, we should take into ac-
count as best we can all the costs and benefits associated with alterna-
tives. Some costs are obviously very difficult to quantify and yet should
9 By December 1981, 3,500 steelworkers had conceded cuts in benefits compared to
14,000 workers in the automobile industry and 19,200 workers in the rubber industry. Bus.
WK., Dec. 21, 1981, at 87.
98 There are about 45 such firms in operation with a total of 60 plants. Whereas an
integrated steel mill, using blast furnaces and oxygen converters, has a minimum efficient
size of four to five million tons and costs several billion dollars to construct, minimills use
the electric steelmaking techniques, operate efficiently at less than 500,000 tons annual out-
put, and cost only $50 to $100 million to build. Due to technical constraints, the majority of
these firms competes only in the markets for carbon-grade bars, rods, and light shapes.
Their total share of the domestic market is now approximately 15 percent, but it is expected
to rise to 25 percent by the end of the decade, largely at the expense of the integrated mills.
Recent closures of bar and rod mills by the large companies were primarily the consequence
of competition by minimills, not by foreign suppliers. See OTA REPORT 1980, supra note 4,
at 251-257.
" U.S. STEE. CORP., 1981, SECOND Q. REP. 2, 4, (1981).
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not be ignored. Calculations such as those made by Crandall'" of the
costs imposed on domestic steel consumers by the VRA or the TPM, neg-
lect benefits that may be traceable to keeping steel workers off unemploy-
ment rolls. On the other hand, these cost estimates also neglect the losses
attributable to prolonging the managerial policies that have diminished
the international competitiveness of the U.S. steel industry, and weak-
ened the competitive power of steel-using industries over the years. 011
Even in selecting the goals for the steel industry, there is little we
can rely on that conforms to normal economic standards. Although many
estimates have been made of the costs of making the U.S. self-sufficient
in steel, no serious study has managed to provide a figure for exactly how
much steel capacity the U.S. "needs" - for the very good reason that,
using neo-classical economics, only the behavior of the market could pro-
vide the answer.10 2
While asserting that their only goal is to eliminate the unfair compe-
tition of subsidized or dumped imports, the domestic steel producers have
strongly urged that imports should be kept to levels that would enable a
profitable U.S. steel industry to satisfy peak steel demand at little or no
price increase. The studies carry estimates of deficiencies in capital ex-
penditures, and set forth the increments that would be required to con-
struct the requisite capacity. 03 Nowhere do the calculations compare the
burden that higher prices would impose on consumers of steel in periods
of moderate or slack demand with the possible benefits, measured with
the present value of whatever price reductions they might enjoy in future
booms.
An alternative to a protectionist policy would directly subsidize the
building of the additional capacity necessary to make the U.S. "self-suffi-
cient" in steel. According to Crandall, who assumed two additional plants
of 6 million tons each, taxpayers would have to provide $2.4 billion a year
if U.S. capacity were to be expanded to match the 1973-1974 level of
consumption. 0 4
Subsidy would avoid the even greater transfers of income from steel
purchasers to all steel producers that would be required to make the in-
cremental plants profitable under the industry's program. Such subsi-
100 R. CRANDALL, supra note 19, at 103-115.
101 See R. CRANDALL, supra note 19, at ch. VII. Crandall's estimates of inefficiencies
resulting from protection focus almost exclusively on transfers of income from consumers of
steel products to steel producers, including workers. Hence, he underestimates the cost of
protection. And compare Crandall's assumption that trigger prices did not raise domestic
steel prices with the discussion in GAO STEEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 6-4 - 6-5.
o See relevant discussions in R. CRANDALL, supra note 19, chapter VI; AISI STEEL
CROSSROAD, supra note 91, at 5-6.
1o Id. at 44-45.
104 R. CRANDALL, supra note 19, at 123.
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dized capacity, however, is unlikely to match the performance of im-
ported steel with respect to product mix, regional supply pattern,
customer service, reliability of deliveries, and price.105 Furthermore, in
the product lines that minimills can supply, domestic capacity will con-
tinue to grow without any need of public financial assistance. On the
other hand, in regional markets showing deficits for the product lines of
integrated mills in the West and Southwest, little import substitution will
be achieved unless the subsidized capacity is to be built in those areas.106
What then, should be our trade policy toward steel? One alternative
is to allow the industry to exercise its rights under the legislation that
Congress has passed to deal with international trade. Under the Trade
Act of 1974107 and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,108 there are a num-
ber of procedures0 9 under which domestic mills can call on governmental
agencies for protective relief. Moreover, the industry can call for help di-
rectly from the President through the Special Trade Representative.110 If
these statutes had been written and applied so that their enforcement
would consistently contribute to maintaining fair competition in interna-
tional trade, there could be no economic loss from the indiscriminate
filing of antidumping and countervailing duty petitions. As the proceed-
ings have developed, however, they do not always conform to the requi-
sites of competitive economics."1 1 Firstly, there is no recognition of the
impact that fluctuating exchange rates have on foreign costs and prices.11 2
Moreover, there is no assurance that such basic concepts as the industry,
105 "Steel users cite many compelling reasons besides price ... for originally purchas-
ing or continuing to purchase foreign steel. They said foreign mills afforded supply quality,
delivered more reliably, and had better marketing services and attitudes. The latter factor
was reapeatedly stressed to us." GAO STEEL REPORT, supra note 12 at 3-11, 3-12.
'" A large amount of idle steelmaking capacity exists in Europe and Japan. Marcus &
Kirsis, supra note 60, at 13. Ocean freight rates remain low compared with domestic rail
costs. Rail freight from Chicago to Los Angeles ranges from $86 to $106 per ton for plates
and structurals compared to $30 to $45 on shipments from Japan. CoNRIL TARIFF AuTHOR-
ITY, TCFB-3001-D-Item 9982-Supp. 11 and C. BRADFORD, STEEL INDUsTRY Q., Nov. 1981
(Publication of Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith) at 39. The enormous cost of a "green-
field" integrated plant could not be justified. Labee, AISI Briefing-Can American Steel
Compete?, IRON AND STEEL ENGINEER at 60 (July 1978).
107 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975); 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1980).
0 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (effective Jan. 1, 1980).
109 K. Cole & J. Dirlam, Remedies Available to New England Fishermen for Protection
against Subsidized or Unfair Competition, 47 U. OF R.I. MARINE MEMO 14 (1981).
11 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, S.301, 19 U.S.C.A. 2411 (1980).
m See generally, Adams & Dirlam, Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974: A
Case Study of Section 201 and Its Interpretation by the International Trade Commission,
52 IND. L.J. 535 (1977); W. Adams, Import Restraints and Industrial Performance In Anti-
trust Law, U. OF MicH. Y.B. OF INT'L LEGAL STUD., (1979), passim.
112 The sections of the antidumping law treating the calculation of fair value make no
mention of exchange rate fluctuations. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1677a, 1677b (1980).
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or the measurement of material injury, will be applied by the Interna-
tional Trade Commission so as to distinguish between fair but vigorous
competition, and unfair competition.
1 3
Some of the measures of material injury upon which the Commission
is directed to rely in reaching its conclusions are only tangentially rele-
vant to distinguishing between fair and unfair competition, such as the
volume of imports, or their increase relative to consumption in the United
States. Furthermore, the Commission tends to apply the tests mechani-
cally.1 4 In effect, the ITC has complete discretion in deciding whether to
blame the industry, the business cycle, or other events for losses in
sales.115
The U.S. antidumping legislation is also warped by the constructed
cost provision.11 6 Although the Act purports to provide a method for de-
termining home market value when the home market value is not obtain-
able, or when the product is produced by countries where costs are not
market determined, the provision is also to be employed when sales in the
home market are made at less than "cost of production." Therefore,
under the statute foreign firms that fail to recoup their full cost by raising
prices during a recession can be accused of selling at less than cost of
production, and hence subjected to the constructed cost standard. The
statute leaves the door open for using constructed cost whenever a foreign
113 Contrast, for instance, the decisions of the ITC, under Sec. 201 of the Trade Act of
1974 in Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor, Report to the
Pres. on Investigation TA-201-44 Under Sec. 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. USITC Publica-
tion 1110, Dec. 1980, with its preliminary determination in Certain Carbon Steel Products
from Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom, Determinations by the Comm. in Investigating Mos. 731-
TA-18-24 (Preliminary) under the Tariff Act of 1930. [Hereinafter cited as Belgian Steel].
USITC Publication 1064, May 1980. The antidumping and countervailing duty statutes, of
course, require the ITC to find only that materially injured "by reason of" imports whereas
the escape clause requires that the imports be a "substantial cause" of "serious injury".
' "Material injury" is defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(a) (Supp. V 1981) as "harm
which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant." The ITC held that imports of
hot-rolled carbon steel sheet and strip from Belgium were a cause of material injury, or a
threat thereof, to the U.S. industry, when the ratio of imports of this product from Belgium
had registered a "dramatic increase" from less than 0.5 percent of apparent domestic con-
sumption in 1980 to 0.7 percent in January-November 1981. Certain steel products from
Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Rumania, the United King-
dom, and West Germany, USITC Pub. No. 1221, Feb. 1982, Vol. I at 34-35. Similarly, im-
ports from France of cold rolled carbon steel sheet and strip were held to cause or threaten
material injury when they had dropped in 1978-1980 from 1 percent to 0.8 percent of appar-
ent domestic consumption, but had risen to 0.9 percent in January-November 1981. Id. at
47.
115 The ITC is to evaluate all relevant factors which have a bearing on the state of the
industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1677, Trade Agreement Act of 1979 § 771(7)(C)(iii) (Pub. L. No. 96-39,
93 Stat. 144 1980).
Ile 19 USC § 1677b(a)(1) Supp. III (1976).
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plant is being subsidized, although the countervailing duty procedures
should more properly apply.117
Countervailing duty statutes are equally obscure and have been sub-
ject to conflicting interpretations and enforcement. While some subsi-
dized competition may be unfair, the purpose of the subsidy, and the con-
ditions of its availability may be significant."1 " Steel firms may have
received financial assistance to train workers, to retain unneeded employ-
ees, and to facilitate the relocation of plants and workers. Whether such
aids amount to subsidies that permit the sale of steel in foreign markets
at lower prices will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis. Where
steel firms have gone into public receivership, operating subsidies will
have to be sorted out from equity contributions by the new owners, the
respective governments. Also, in some cases the national interest may dic-
tate close cooperation with an ally and the Department of Commerce may
be unwilling to conduct a thorough investigation of subsidies."'
Finally, the easy access to governmental agencies permits the domes-
tic firms to launch antidumping or countervailing duty proceedings with
the assurance that most of the costs of the proceeding will be borne by
the Department of Commerce and the ITC."2 ° Once underway, the pro-
17 The European Economic Community has amended its antidumping code by adopt-
ing a provision similar to the constructed-cost section of the U.S. statute, perhaps in order
to strengthen its retaliatory powers. No. 3017/79, Dec. 1980. The arbitrary character of the
constructed-cost provision is illustrated by its use in the Gilmore case, where in the absence
of information on the exporter's production cost, the Treasury simply used U.S. data (which
are far from accurate). See Mueller & Kawahito, An Examination of Recent Allegations of
Japanese Steel Dumping, 5 J. OF ECON. 79 (1979); 42 Fed. Reg. 54489 (1977); 43 Fed. Reg.
2033 (1978), and USITC PUBLICATION 882, CARBON STEEL PLATE FROM JAPAN, DETERMINA-
TION OF INJURY IN INVESTIGATION No. AA1921-179 UNDER THE ANTIDUMPING ACT, 1921, AS
AMENDED, TOGETHER WITH INFORMATION OBTAINED IN THE INVESTIGATION, Apr. 1978 at A-19.
118 See FTC STEEL REPORT, supra note 15, Chapter 6 for the diversity of purposes for
which national governments made financing available to steel companies and the burdens,
in the form of interferences with price and employment policies, that those companies were
forced to accept. While the GATT code appears to make allowance for offsetting the bur-
dens against the aids the U.S. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. No. 96, 93 Stat. 178
1979) leaves only an extremely narrow margin for compensatory consideration.
119 See Cole & Dirlam, supra note 109 at 11; General agreement on tariffs and trade,
concluded Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI, 61, Stat. A3, A23 T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 in
United States Canadian Trade Policies: Impact on Border State Industries, Hearings
before Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) at 547-548.
110 The Commerce Department suspends liquidation, that is the closing of a customs
file on an import entry, upon its affirmative finding in a preliminary less-than-fair or sub-
sidy value determination, which must be made no later than 85 days after an investigation is
begun. The International Trade Commission must hand down a preliminary determination
in its investigation on the presence or threat of material injury within 45 days of the begin-
ning of the investigation. If these determinations are affirmative, both these agencies con-
tinue with their investigations. See Cole & Dirlam, supra note 109, at 4-11; McCormack,
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ceeding cannot be stopped, except by withdrawal of the petition."'1 The
importer and his customers must be prepared to spend disproportionate
amounts of time and money in fighting allegations that are often without
merit. Use of the Trade Acts for harassment is common.12 2
For these reasons, we are loath to advocate, as a substitute for TPM,
free resort to the import injury, antidumping, and countervailing duty
provisions of the Trade Acts by the steel industry. Nor do these statutes
seem to lend themselves to an effective program for coping with what is a
genuine instance of unfair competition; export of steel to the United
States from government-owned mills enjoying protected home markets
when these mills have been designed to earn foreign exchange, to add to
national prestige, or to constitute one segment in a program of high-cost
industrial self-sufficiency.
A second alternative, at least with respect to pricing rules, may be to
bring the behavior of foreign steel sold in U.S. markets under the same
statute that governs the behavior of domestic companies, Section 2 of the
Clayton Act.123 The change would permit foreign suppliers to meet the
realized prices of their domestic competitors regardless of the levels at
which prevailing exchange rates may have pegged their production costs
or home-market prices. Subjecting all sales made in U.S. markets to a
single set of rules may help eliminate some of the undesirable volatility of
import volume caused by unstable currency ratios. It is also possible,
however, that it may lead to an equally undesirable rigidity of the price
structure. The proposal may nevertheless by worth a thorough
examination.
Of course, there are economists 24 who take the position that imports
should always be welcomed, whether or not they are subsidized, or being
sold at discriminatorily low prices. Where domestic producers and work-
ers can easily adapt to changing volume of output, the savings from
supra note 31, at 298-299 and 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a, 1671b, 1673a, 1673b, 1678d (1976).
121 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c, 1673c (1976).
122 The "procedural protectionism" afforded by the antidumping and countervailing
duty law is substantial. Imports are inevitably disrupted upon the filing of a countervailing
duty or antidumping petition, because the importer is at risk, substantial duties may be
added to those already in force. The Commerce Department suspends liquidation of duties
20 days after the filing of a petition and requires posting of a bond equal to the amount of
subsidy or dumping margin found in the preliminary determination. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b (d)
(2), 1673b(d) (1976). P. Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination:
United States Countervailing and Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-The United
States and the International Antidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1958); Adams &
Dirlam, supra note 111, passim; McCormack, supra note 31, at 301-302.
123 See Adams & Dirlam, Dumping Antitrust Policy and Economic Power, MICH. ST. U.
Bus. Topics, Spring 1966 at 22-24; Schwartz, Antitrust and Trading with State-Controlled
Economics, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 513, 523 (1980).
124 FEDERAL TRADE COMMiSSION, supra note 15, passim Ch. 8.
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purchasing low-priced imports may indeed exceed the cost of moving re-
sources into and out of the market. It hardly needs to be pointed out
that any easy and cost-free mobility of resources is not among the charac-
teristics of integrated steelmaking. The construction and starting up of
integrated capacity is a costly process as is the complete shutdown of a
major integrated facility. While these costs may not represent a valid rea-
son for protecting domestic producers from foreign competitors possess-
ing clearcut comparative advantage, they caution against the facile ac-
ceptance of the argument'25 that all imports at cut-rate prices increase
the national welfare.
In sum, we support a trade policy that, by keeping the market open
to the hard competition provided by efficient foreign steel producers,
forces the integrated domestic suppliers and their employees to seek the
highest possible level of operating efficiency and technological perform-
ance. Besides, as we have pointed out, a substantial share of imports has
been complementary, not adversary, to domestically produced steel. Cer-
tain regions and steel consumers would suffer severely if imported steel
became unavailable. 2 ' Regarding the segment of the market that can be
supplied by domestic minimills, we have no doubt that the vigorously
competitive behavior of these firms will ensure an outcome of optimum
resource allocation and economic progress.
Because steel is an essential material for the American manufactur-
ing sector, the reindustrialization of this sector can be furthered by assur-
ing American steel users that they will have access to steel products on
similar terms as their foreign competitors, especially regarding price and
quality. In other words, our analysis has shown that protecting the do-
12" According to the Fed. Trade Comm., imports should not be challenged unless they
are being sold in the U.S. market at less than marginal cost. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISsION,
supra note 15, passim Ch. 8. Following the same prescription, domestic mills should also
adopt marginal cost pricing. Although the proposal has a certain theoretical attraction, it
can scarcely be used as the basis for policy. See Dirlam, Marginal Cost Pricing Test for
Predatory Pricing: Naive Welfare Economics and Public Policy, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 769,
804-06, 811-14 (1981). A full cost policy, such as that advocated by the U.S. steel industry,
and incorporated in the constructed cost test, is even more objectionable. See our discussion
supra p.19.
126 According to the FTC proposal, imports should not be challenged unless American
consumers of sheet and plate products located in the Western and Southwestern states
would have to pay higher prices for two reasons. First, higher freight costs would be in-
curred to bring these products from domestic plants clustered in the Great Lakes and East-
ern regions. See note 59, supra. Second, these mills have higher production costs than
many of their foreign competitors. Adams & Mueller, supra note 6, at 121-24; Marcus &
Kirsis supra note 5, Table 5. The inability of the domestic industry to supply the U.S.
market with more than 90 percent of total requirements in years of relatively normal de-
mand such as 1978 and 1979 is shown in Table 1 (strong consumption) and in Table 3 (high
capacity utilization).
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mestic steel industry by raising the cost of steel reduces the American
manufacturing sector's international competitiveness and, hence, its
chances for swift reindustrialization.
We suggest, however, that there should be monitoring of steel ship-
ments from industries launched with government sponsorship and en-
joying protected home markets. In our view, irregular surges of such ship-
ments may discourage investments by efficient domestic producers and,
over the longer term, prove harmful to the interests of American steel
consumers. Because the majority of these steel mills are located in coun-
tries of the Third World and the Communist Bloc, this problem may ulti-
mately have to be resolved within the framework of North-South and
East-West talks.
Table 1
UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE IN STELL MILL PRODUCTS
(in thousands of net tons)
Net
Shipment Imports as a
by U.S.A. Percentage of
Steel Apparent Apparent
Producers Exports Imports Consumption Consumption
1959 69,377 1,677 4,396 72,096 6.1
1960 71,149 2,977 3,359 71,531 4.7
1961 66,126 1,990 3,163 67,299 4.7
1962 70,552 2,013 4,100 72,639 5.6
1963 75,552 2,224 5,446 78,777 6.9
1964 84,945 3,442 6,440 87,943 7.3
1965 92,666 2,496 10,383 100,553 10.3
1966 89,995 1,724 10,753 99,024 10.9
1967 83,897 1,685 11,455 93,667 12.2
1968 91,856 2,170 17,960 107,646 16.7
1969 93,877 5,229 14,034 102,682 13.7
1970 90,798 7,062 13,364 97,100 13.8
1971 87,038, 2,827 18,304 102,515 17.9
1972 91,805 2,873 17,681 106,613 16.6
1973 111,430 4,052 15,150 122,528 12.4
1974 109,472 5,833 15,970 119,609 13.4
1975 79,957 2,953 12,012 89,016 13.5
1976 89,447 2,654 14,285 101,078 14.1
1977 91,147 2,003 19,307 108,451 17.8
1978 97,935 2,422 21,135 116,648 18.1
1979 100,262 2,818 17,518 114,962 15.2
1980 83,853 4,101 15,491 95,243 16.3
1981 87,024 2,904 19,898 104,008 19.1
1982 59,783 1,842 16,663 74,604 22.3
Source: AISI, Annual Statistical Report.
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TABLE 4
Indicators of Technological Performance, 1980
U.S. Total EC Germany Japan
Plants Capacity of the largest 5 plants, in
million net tons (mNT) of maximum
raw steel output 36 52 34 68
Capacity of the largest 10 plants, in
mNT of maximum raw steel output 59 83 -- 112
Number of plants with a raw steel
capacity in excess of 6 mNT 4 8 2 12
Blast Furnaces (Smelting)
No. of blast furnaces with an inner volume in
excess of 70,629 cubic feet (2,000 cubic
meters) 6 19 8 39
Adoption of the bell-less system* 0.5% 9% 8% 8%
(best practice: 100%)
Fuel rate (coke and fuel oil only)** 0.596 0.538 0.540 0.466
(best practice: 0.460-0.480)
Steelshops (Melting)
Total output, in mNT 111.8 140.9 48.3 122.8
Output in oxygen converters, mNT 67.6 102.8 37.8 92.7
Output in electric furnaces, mNT 31.2 33.5 9.6 30.1
Output with obsolete methods, mNT 13.1 4.5 3.2 --
Adoption of modem melting processes 88.4% 96.8% 93.3% 100.0%
(best practice: 100%)
Continuous Casting
Output in mNT 22.7 55.2 22.3 73.1
Adoption rate 20.3% 39.2% 46.0% 59.5%
(best practice: 85-95%)***
Yield, or the amount of finished steel
obtained per ton or raw steel produced 72% 77% 75% 85%
(adjusted for differences in product mix)
Notes: *Data refer to the year 1977; **U.S. 1979, other data refer to the year 1978; ***Cer-
tain products, such as very large plates, can only be produced via the conventional
ingot route.
Sources: American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Report; Steel at the Cross-
roads, January 1980, Chaps. 3 & 5; Japan Iron and Steel Federation, TeKKo
ToKei NenKan International Iron and Steel Institute, A Handbook of World
Steel Statistics, 1978; World Steel In Figures, 1980; Office of Technology Assess-
ment, Technology and Steel Industry Competitiveness, 1980, Chaps. 4 & 5;
Jonathan Aylan, Innovation in the British Steel Industry, in TECHNICAL INNOVA-
TION AND BarrTSH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, at 211, 213, 218, 220 (Keith Pavitt ed.
1980).
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TABLE V
Differences in the Equipment Vintage of Major Steel Industries
U.S. EC(9) Japan
Proportion of 1974 capacity installed before 1960 36% 26% 0%
Age of coke ovens: older than 10 years 84% 67% 32%
older than 20 years 57% 37% 2%
Cold-rolling mills: older than 10 years 89% 83% 66%
older than 20 years 56% 42% 11%
Plate mills: older than 10 years 83% 84% 66%
older than 20 years 55% 46% 13%
Sources: for coke-oven age, L. J. Holschuh, Annual Report, 13th ilSI Annual Conference,
Sidney Australia, Oct. 1979, pp. 7-8; for other data, K. Kawahito, Issues of World Steel
Production and Trade in the 1980s, Monograph No. 26, Business and Economic Research
Center, Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, Tenn., Dec. 1980, pp. 60, 63.

